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INTRODUCTION

Amina Lawal is a thirty-one year old illiterate, unemployed
mother of three children. 1 She has been married and divorced
twice. 2 Amina was living in her father's house in Kurami,
Nigeria, when a fellow villager reported that Amina's youngest
daughter, Wasila was born out of wedlock. 3 At that point,
Amina' s life was forever changed.
The Islamic court charged Amina with adultery and she
confessed, although having a daughter born more than nine

* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Syracuse University College of Law; B.A. Political Science St.
Michael's College, 2001. Special thanks to Professor Leslie Bender for her time,
commitment, and assistance with this article, and to the staff of the Syracuse Journal of
International Law and Commerce, especially the editorial board, for their hard work and
dedication.
1. David Finkel, Adultery's Cost: Death by Stoning, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002.
2. Id.
3. Amnesty International UK, Save Amina From Death by Stoning [hereinafter
Amnesty International UK], at http://www.mertonai.org/amina/amina.asp (last visited Mar.
21, 2004 and the hard copy is available in the Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce office).
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months after divorcing was proof of her crime. 4 The man that
Amina identified as Wasila's father, Yahaya Muhammad, denied
the charge and swore on the Koran that he was innocent. 5
Muhammad escaped conviction because the prosecution could not
produce four eyewitnesses to the fornication, the necessary burden
of proof under Islamic law for a male. 6 Amina was not as
fortunate.
On March 22, 2002, the Shari' a court at Bakori in Katsina
State sentenced Amina to death by stoning for her act of adultery. 7
The court scheduled Amina's execution for spring 2004, when
Wasila stopped breastfeeding. 8 Death by stoning involves the
burying of the person to their neck in the ground and then
continuous stoning to the head until death. 9 On August 19, 2002,
an Islamic high court in Nigeria rejected Amina's appeal and
instead upheld her sentence to death by stoning for having had sex
out of wedlock. 10
On January 23, 2003, the Shari'a court of appeals grand khadi
(chief judge) refused to comment on her guilt or innocence. II
However, the judge did state, "The best deterrent is the death
sentence, for people to see what happens to a fornicator. They
watch you be stoned to death. They wouldn't want it to happen to
them."I 2 The judge went on to say, "[t]his case is an ordinary
case, as simple as drinking water." 13 Amina's case was adjourned
for another two months after only ten minutes of deliberations. 14
On September 25, 2003, the Shari'a Court of Appeal in
Nigeria overturned Amina's conviction. 15 The court held the

4. Amnesty International UK, supra note 3; Finkel, supra note 1.
5. Finkel, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Bianca Jagger, All Miss World contestants must quit now; only a complete boycott
can bring Nigeria to its senses, THE LONDON EVENING STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2002.
8. Finkel, supra note 1.
9. Amnesty International UK, supra note 3; JeffKoinage, Woman Sentenced to Stoning
Freed, CNN, Sept. 26, 2003 at www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/09/25/nigeria.stoning/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Woman Freed].
10. Associated Press, Court Upholds Stoning For Nigerian Mother, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2002 [hereinafter AP, Ct. Upholds].
11. Somini Sengupta, As Stoning Case Proceeds, Nigeria Stands Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2003.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Woman Freed, supra note 9.
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conviction invalid because Amina was pregnant when Shari' a was
implemented in her province and other procedural errors. 16 In his
opinion, Judge Ibrahim Mai-Unguwa found Shari'a to be
interpreted as allowing up to five years for gestation, providing
for the possibility that Amina's ex-husband of two years could
have been Wasila's father. 17 Had the Court of Appeals affirmed
her conviction and sentence to stoning, Amina would have had
two additional appeals to Nigerian federal courts, which are not
governed by Shari' a. 18
Twelve Nigerian states have put Islamic Law (Shari'a) into
practice since the implementation of civilian rule, which replaced
military dictatorship in 1999 . 19 Amina is the second woman to be
convicted of having sex out of wedlock; the first was Safiya
Hussiaini who had also been sentenced to death by stoning. 20 On
March 26, 2002, a high court in Lagos, Nigeria acquitted
Hussiaini due to lack of evidence based upon the admission by her
ex-husband that he had fathered the child.21
This article follows Amina Lawal' s story to illustrate the
inability of international law to protect the rights of women. In
just over three years, four people in northern Nigeria have been
sentenced to death for adultery, and one convicted murderer was
hanged. 22 In 2000, a teenager was publicly flogged for the crime
of adultery after three men raped her. 23 If Amina's conviction had
been upheld, she would have been the first to be executed for
adultery since the implementation of Shari'a in Nigeria. 24 Her
death would have likely added fuel to an already incendiary civil
conflict between the northern Shari' a states and the southern
democratic states. 25 In order to understand how Shari' a came to
power in Nigeria, it is important to understand the history of

16. Associated Press, Nigerian Woman Avoids Stoning Death, U.S.A. Today, Sept. 25,
2003, available at www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-09-25-niger-stoning_x.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter AP, Woman Avoids].
17. Id.
18. Woman Freed, supra note 9.
19. AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10.
20. Associated Press, Nigerian Woman Condemned to Death by Stoning is Acquitted,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002. [hereinafter AP, Nigerian Woman].
21. Id.
22. Finkel, supra note 1.
23. Natasha Walter, Beauty and the Beasts, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Nov. 8, 2002.
24. Sengupta, supra note 11.
25. Id.
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political unrest that has plagued the country since
decolonialization.
Part I of this article develops Nigeria's history of political
unrest and deeply divided Muslim and Christian population
resulting in the recent emergence of religious governance by
Shari'a Law. Part II describes current international law as well as
Nigeria's international commitments under three specific treaties.
The three treaties discussed are the Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W"), the
Optional Protocol to CEDA W ("The Protocol"), and the
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"). Part III details
how Shari'a Law conflicts with Nigeria's commitments under the
treaties and what enforcement mechanisms have failed to allow
for such insubordination.
Finally, Part IV of this article sets forth proposals for the
future of international law. These proposals include how the
international community can alter treaties and the treaty
reservation process to better effectuate the goals they set forth.
These suggestions will be applied to Amina Lawal to demonstrate
how such changes could have saved her from her sentenced
execution.
I. NIGERIA'S POLITICAL HISTORY

On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent country
by an act of the British Parliament. 26 Britain had controlled
Nigeria since its colonization of the protectorate in 1861. 27 As a
result of the colonization, the official language is English. 28 Since
decolonialization, Nigeria has experienced many systems of
government. 29
Following independence,
a democratic

26. The History of Nigeria accessed through the Library of Congress, available at
http://memoryJoe.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ng003 3) (last visited Apr.
10, 2004 )[hereinafter History].
27. Associated Press, Time line of Nigerian Government, BBC, January 10,
2001.[hereinafter AP, Timeline]
28. History, supra note 26.
29. See generally, Ema Orji, Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A
Universal Human Rights Perspective, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 431 (2001) (discussing how
Nigeria's history of political unrest has influenced its present views on human rights); See
also, Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform
Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2002) (discussing the history of political
corruption within the Nigerian government).
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parliamentary system with a prime minister and a governor
general was established. 30 The governor general was much like
the British monarch and performed essentially ceremonial tasks,
whereas the prime minister was charged with leading state
affairs. 31 The parliament was composed of a House of
Representatives, with 312 members, and a Senate, with 44
members. 32 The public elected all members of the House and all
Senators were chosen by regional legislatures. 33
There were two main parties that appeared during the first
few years following independence: the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroons ("NCNC") and the Northern Peoples'
Congress ("NPC"). 34 These conflicting parties were heavily
represented in the country's first election in 1964. 35 Conflicts
arose because the three major ethnic tribes, The Hausa in the
north, The Ibo in the east, and the Yoruba in the south and west
refused to work together. 36 Civil wars in the east led to a military
That same year the
administration taking over in 1966. 37
constitution was amended to remove the supremacy of the
constitution as the law of the land. 38 This provision ended the
federal court's ability to entertain questions of constitutional
human rights violations by subsequent legislation. 39
Current Nigerian President, Olusengun Obasanjo, military
dictator from 1976 to 1979, was the only dictator able to return
the country to civilian control. 40 The military retained power in
Nigeria despite multiple coups and assassination of leaders. 41 In
1995, the European Union imposed a three-year sanction against
In 1999,
Nigeria for its gross human rights violations. 42

30. History, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 0. Igho Natufe, Ph.D., Midwest State and the Future of Nigerian Federalism,
available at http://www.dawodu.net/igho.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
35. Id.
36. Joel E. Starr, "What Do You Have For Me Today?" Observing the 1999 Nigerian
Presidential Election, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 390-91 (1999).
37. History, supra note 26.
38. Christian N. Okeke, International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, 27 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 311, 340 (1997).
39. Id.
40. Starr, supra note 36, at 391.
41. History, supra note 26.
42. AP, Timeline, supra note 27.
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democratic elections in parliament and the presidency brought the
election of Obasanjo and, at the same time, Islamic law was
reintroduced in the northern Nigerian states. 43 Although the two
events occurred within the same year, Obasanjo did not facilitate
the introduction of Shari' a law, it was a result of the Muslim
dominance in the northern states. 44 At the time of the election,
Nigeria had a fifty percent literacy rate and, of the 107 million
residents, sixty percent were registered voters. 45 However, only
fifty percent of the registered voters turned out to vote in the 1999
election. 46
The Nigerian Constitution was redrafted in 1999 .47 There are
two sections of the Constitution that created tension surrounding
the implementation of Shari' a. First, the Constitution does not
allow for the death penalty or torture:
Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived
intentionally of his life ... every individual is entitled to respect for the
dignity of his person, and accordingly ... no Eerson shall be subject to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. 8
Therefore, the punishment of execution that Shari' a
proscribes is unconstitutional.
Second, the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
freely practice their chosen religion as proscribed by their holy
books:
Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in
private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship,
teaching, practice and observance. 49
The holy book of Islam, the Koran, directs its followers on
how to behave and what the repercussions are for

43. AP, Timeline, supra note 27.
44. Id.
45. Starr, supra note 36, at 390-91.
46. Id. at 397.
47. See generally, Jennifer Tyus, Going too Far: Extending Shari'a Law in Nigeria
from Personal to Public Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 199 (2004) (comparing the
Constitution of Nigeria to that of other predominantly Muslim states).
48. NIG. CONST. ch. IV, §§ 33(1), 34(1), available at http://www.nigerialaw.org/ConstitutionOITheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter Constitution].
49. Id. at §38(1).
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noncompliance. 50
Furthermore, the Islamic courts are recognized by the
Constitution in chapter VII, the Judicature. 51 The scope of the
Islamic court's power is enumerated and includes topics such as
marriage, guardianship of the infirmed, and succession of
property. 52 The final appeal for all cases heard by the Islamic
courts resides in the highest court for Nigeria, the Federal High
Court. 53 The complicated web of Islamic and federal courts may
become the focal point for confrontation between religion and
democratic rule.
Nigerian President Obasanjo received considerable pressure
from the international community against the use of Shari' a in the
twelve northern states. 54 This pressure stems from the fact that
civil conflict has taken the lives of more than 10,000 Nigerians
The government has
since Obasanjo' s election in 1999. 55
reluctantly declared its official condemnation for the use of harsh
punishments under Shari' a, but has yet to take affirmative action
to prevent their application. 56 While the government sat idle, the
opposition to Shari' a has sparked violence throughout the country
resulting in over two thousand deaths in two years. 57 Supporters
of Shari' a allege a violation of their religious rights and claim that
non-Muslims have a separate court system and, therefore, no right
to interfere. 58 Opponents to Shari' a point to the egregious human
rights violations and constitutional violations, combined with the

50. See generally, Karima Benrioune As-Sa/mu' Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in
Islamic Jurisprudence 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 605 (1994) (discussing the role of Islamic Law
in principles of contemporary humanitarian law); Edna Boyle-Lewicki, Need World's
Collide: The Hadad Crimes of Islamic Law & International Human Rights, 13 N.Y. INT'L L.
R.Ev. 43 (2000) (illustrating how crime and punishment under Islamic law compare with
international human rights law); Joelle Entelis, International Human Right: Islam's Friend
or Foe?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1251 (1997) (discussing international human rights for
women as illustrated by the enforcement of Islamic law in Algeria).
51. See generally, NIG. CONST., supra note 49, ch. VII.
52. Id. at §262(2).
53. Id.
54. Walter, supra note 23.
55. Associated Press, Nigerian Oil Crisis Worsens, CNN.COM, Mar. 23, 2003.
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/03/23/nigeria.oilnew/index.html.
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004). [hereinafter AP, Oil Crises].
56. Walter, supra note 23.
57. AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10.
58. Associated Press, Nigeria Shari'a Architect Defends Law, BBC NEWS, Mar. 21,
2002.
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lack of government response as justification for intervention. 59
In November 2002, the clash between Muslim and Christian
states erupted in the capital city of Abuja as the Miss World
Pageant was scheduled to take place there in December. 60
Contestants boycotted the event as a means of drawing attention to
the treatment of women in the Shari'a states. 61 The pageant
became a world stage for international protest for human rights. 62
Over a hundred people were killed in riots that erupted after a
newspaper suggested the Prophet Mohammed would have
approved of the Miss World Pageant and likely chosen a wife
from among the contestants. 63 Mobs of protestors looted shops,
smashed windows, and burned churches and mosques, while
stabbing, bludgeoning, and burning bystanders. 64 As a result of
the violent reaction by the northern Shari' a states and the inability
of the government to control the situation, the organizers of the
pageant relocated to London. 65
Consequently, the Miss World Pageant highlighted Amina
Lawal' s story and the general disparate treatment of women under
Shari' a law into an international arena. Amnesty International
launched an international campaign opposing Shari' a and
condemning the harsh punishments as "gender persecution" and
"discriminatory punishment that deliberately flouts the Nigerian
constitution." 66 Human rights groups worldwide allege that the
imposition of Shari'a violates Nigeria's commitments under
international law, and, therefore, the international community has
a right and duty to intervene. 67
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

International human rights law began with the establishment

59. Ema Orji, Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human
Rights Perspective, 25 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 431 (2001 ).
60. Walter, supra note 23.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Associated Press, Miss World Leaves Nigeria, CNN, Nov. 22, 2002. available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/11/22/nigeria.missworld/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2004) [hereinafter AP, Miss World Leaves Nigeria].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10.
67. See generally Women Freed, supra note 9.
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of the United Nations on October 24, 1945. 68 On that date,
representatives from fifty countries came together in San
Francisco to develop the Charter of the United Nations. 69 The
purpose set forth in the United Nations Charter is to promote and
encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 70 The
drafters of the U .N. Charter clearly stated that the provisions of
the Charter apply to all states, even non-member states, as far as
may be necessary to maintain international peace and security. 71
There are currently one hundred ninety-one member states of the
United Nations, including Nigeria, which became a member on
October 7, 1960. 72
The United Nations is the primary international organization
originally designed to prevent military confrontations among its
members. 73 The General Assembly is the principal decisionmaking body and is comprised of representatives from all member
states, each having one vote. 74 All treaties come before the
General Assembly for deliberation and approval. 75
Over the last fifty years, the United Nations has focused
increasingly on the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all. 76 These goals are effectuated through the
creation and adoption of international agreements. 77 Human rights
treaties are unique due to the lack of direct advantages or
disadvantages to state parties. 78 There is no direct advantage to
the state because the citizens are the beneficiaries; and there is no
direct disadvantage if another state party stipulates a reservation
because the citizens of the reserving state will be impacted, not

68. About the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm.
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004)[hereinafter About the UN].
69. About the UN, supra note 68.
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
71. Id. art. 2, para. 6.
72. List of Member States, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html.
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
73. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 505-06 (3d ed.
1999).
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 9, para. 1, 2; art. 18, para. 1.
75. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 73, at 503.
76. Id. at 507.
77. Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDA W Universal: A Critique of CEDA W's Reservation
Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 605, 624 (2002).
78. Id.
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other parties to the treaty. 79
There are three agreements central to the practice of Shari' a
in Nigeria. They are: the Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W"), the
Optional Protocol to CEDA W, and the Convention Against
Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("CAT").
Nigeria is a member of CEDA W, a
signatory of the Optional Protocol and a member of CAT. 80

A. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms ofDiscrimination
Against Women
CEDA W entered into force on September 3, 1981. 81 With one
hundred sixty-eight member states, it is now the second most
widely ratified human rights treaty, after the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. 82 CEDA W began with the concern that,
despite prior international agreements concerning human rights,
extensive discrimination against women continued to exist. 83
Article 5 of CEDA W calls for States to "modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women. " 84 Consequently,
each member state is bound to take all appropriate measures to
ensure that discrimination against women is eliminated in both the
political and private life of the country. 85 Furthermore, CEDAW
outlines internationally accepted rights applicable to all women
including reproductive rights, the right to change nationality,
equal access to healthcare, right to marry, right to vote, and the
right to be free from exploitation. 86 It prescribes ways in which

79. Id.
80. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dec. 9, 2002 at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last modified Apr. 15, 2004).
81. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/CEDAW/cedaw.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2004) [hereinafter CEDAW].
82. Elizabeth Evatt, Finding a Voice for Women's Rights: The Early Days of CEDA W,
34 GEO. WASH. lNT'L L. REv. 515, 516 (2002); See generally Malvina Halberstam, United
States Ratification of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31
GEO. WASH. J. lNT'L. & EcoN.49 (1997); Sean D. Murphy, Senate Consideration ofCEDAW
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 971 (2002) (discussing why the U.S. had thus far refused to join both
CEDAW and the Optional Protocol).
83. CEDAW, supra note 81, at Preamble.
84. Id. art 5, sec. a.
85. Id. art. VII.
86. See generally AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/6

10

Nicolai: Islamic Law and the International Protection of Women's Rights:

2004]

Islamic Law in Nigeria

309

member states can effectuate the main purpose of CEDA W: to
effectively end discrimination from both the public and private
lives of women. 87
In order to become a member state to CEDA W, each country
must either sign and ratify, or accede to the treaty. 88 Signatories
to CEDA W are obligated to refrain from acting in any way that
would frustrate its object and purpose. 89 Upon ratification or
accession, states are legally bound to put into practice the
standards set forth in the text of the convention. 90 Specifically,
Article 2 of CEDA W states:
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all forms
[and furthermore] take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise;
and to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices, which
constitute discrimination against women. 91
CEDA W further requires member states to submit a report
within one year after ratification or accession, and then every four
years thereafter detailing how the standards are being
implemented within that country. 92
CEDAW represents a divergence from the generally accepted
standard that government should not interfere with the private
lives of their citizens. 93 CEDA W recognizes the international
right to privacy, yet not at the cost of equality. 94 Member states to
CEDA W recognize that women often need the most protection in
their private sphere, especially in the areas of child bearing, child
rearing, and marriage. 95 Therefore, CEDA W respects customary
practices and their expression, but does not allow them to act as a

87. Michele Brandt, The Tension Between Women's Rights and Religious Rights:
Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105, 106
(1995-1996).
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art 11 at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter VCLT].
89. Id. art. 19.
90. Id. art 14-15.
91. CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 2, secs. e-f.
92. Id. art. 18.
93. Eve McCabe, The Inadequacy of International Human Rights Law to Protect the
Rights of Women as Illustrated by the Crises in Afghanistan, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 419, 428 (2000-2001).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 429.
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means of denying women equal rights. 96
CEDA W defines "discrimination against women" as:
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field. 97
Utilization of the term "effect" forgoes the need to prove
discriminatory intent. 98 Therefore, a member state is in violation
of CEDA W not only for intentional discrimination, but also for
any action or inaction that leads to inequity in the treatment of
men and women. 99
B. The Optional Protocol

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of discrimination against Women [hereinafter the
Protocol] presents an optimistic future for the enforcement of
CEDA W . 100 The Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on October 6, 1999 and it entered into force
on December 22, 2000. 101 The purpose of the Protocol is to
remedy past inconsistencies in the application of CEDA W by
member states, and enhance the protections it affords to women. 102

96. Id.
97. CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 1.
98. Kerri L. Ritz, Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a Remedy
for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 25
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 191, 196 (2001).
99. See generally Anne F. Bayefsky, The CEDAW Convention Today 94 AM. Soc'v
INT'L L. PROC. 197 (2000) (discussing the CEDAW reporting process and its structural
inadequacies); Aida Gonzalez Martinez Human Rights of Women 5 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y
157 (2001) (discussing generally the CEDAW and its impact on women's rights); Brad R.
Roth, The CEDA W as a Collective Approach to Women 's Rights 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 187
(2002).
100. McCabe, supra note 93, at 433; See generally, Laboni Amena Hoq, The Women's
Convention and its Optional Protocol: Empowering Women to Claim Their Internationally
Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 677 (2001) (comparing the rights identified
in each CEDAW and the Protocol).
101. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, 54th Sess. (1999) art. 2 [hereinafter
Protocol] at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanarts/instree/cedawopprot-2000.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2004 and a hardcopy is filed in the Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce office).
102. Id.
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An example of such enhancement on CEDA W is Article 2 of
the Protocol, commonly referred to as the communications
provision. 103
This section allows for individuals, or their
representative, to bring claims for violations of any of the rights
of the Convention. 104 This represents an enormous advantage for
individuals over the rights allowed for by CEDA W, which only
allowed for states to bring claims on behalf of their citizens. 105
Because it is often the government of the state itself which either
proactively, or inactively, supports the discrimination, it can be
viewed as counterintuitive to allow only the state to bring a claim
under CEDA W. In choosing to ratify the Protocol, states allow
the CEDAW Committee to accept claims against them by one or
more of their citizens.
The CEDAW committee is comprised of individuals with
expertise in the area of human rights, serving not as agents of the
state but in their personal capacity . 106 There are twenty-three
members, all from different member states. 107
The 2003
committee includes Fatima Kwaku of Nigeria. 108 The inquiry
provision on the Protocol allows the Committee to "probe into
situations of grave or systematic violations of reservations to any
of its terms." 109 Article 5 of the Protocol allows for the
Committee to request a state party to take interim measures
necessary to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims of
the alleged violation. 110 Therefore, an individual would not have
to wait for relief pending resolution of their claim. However, the
Committee will only consider the complaints after the complainant
demonstrates that he exhausted all domestic remedies available. 111
The Protocol establishes a system of review whereby the state
party, after being found in violation of the Convention, may be
visited and observed by the Committee and will have six months
to respond as well as accepting the duty to keep the Committee

103. Ritz, supra note 98, at 198.
104. Protocol, supra note 101 art. 2.
105. CEDAW, supra note 81, at art. 2.
106. Members
of
the
2003
CEDAW
Committee,
available
at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/members.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter CEDAW Committee].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ritz, supra note 98, at 199.
110. CEDAW, supra note 81, at art.5.
111. Id.
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informed on its progress. 112 The greatest step forward taken by
the Protocol is that parties may not enter reservations to any of its
terms. 113 However, there is an opt-out clause whereby states can
declare upon ratification or accession that they do not accept the
inquiry procedure. 114 Although the adoption of this protocol is a
significant step toward effectuating the goals of the Convention,
it, like all international law, derives its force from the willingness
of the state party to not only sign and ratify, but to comply
without the threat of a concrete enforcement mechanism.
C. The Convention Against Torture

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT") was adopted by
the General Assembly on December 10, 1984.11 5 "Torture" is
defined in Article 1 as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. 116
Parties to CAT are bound to take all measures necessary to
prevent acts of torture and are allowed no exceptional
CAT further effectuates the
circumstances whatsoever. 117
prohibition of torture by providing that no party may extradite a
person to another state where they have substantial grounds for
112. Protocol, supra note 101, at art. 8-9; See for example Report of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 27th Sess., 11 (Oct. 8, 2002), available
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/27 sess.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
113. Ritz, supra note 98, at 199; See generally Barbara Cochrane Alexander,
Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence
Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 895 (2000); Andrea Montavon-McKillip, CAT Among
Pigeons: The Convention Against Torture: A Precarious Intersection Between International
Human Rights Law and U.S. Immigration Law, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 247 (2002) (discussing the
domestic implications of CAT in the United States).
114. Id. at FN 47, citing Protocol, supra note 101, art. 8-9.
115. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984 [hereinafter CA 1].
116. Id. art. 1.
117. Id. art. 2.
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believing that the person would be in danger of being tortured. 118
CAT also establishes the right for an individual who has been
subjected to torture to bring a cause of action for compensation
and rehabilitation, which is in addition to any cause of action
arising under the national laws of that state. 119
CAT established a Committee Against Torture to oversee the
accordance of member states with the principles set forth within
the treaty . 120
The Committee has the right to investigate
indications of systematic torture and report their findings to the
United Nations Secretary General, who will in turn report to the
General Assembly. 121 In the event that a state is found to be in
violation of its duties under CAT and is unable to reach an
agreement with the Committee, the General Assembly may
sanction the state. 122
Ill. NIGERIA'S RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW

A. CEDAW

As previously stated, Nigeria is a member of CEDAW and
CAT and a signatory to the Protocol. Having ratified CEDAW
and CAT, Nigeria has undertaken the legal obligations outlined by
each treaty, and did so without reservation. 123 In ratifying
CEDA W and CAT, Nigeria indicated to the international
community that it was committed to effectuating the treaty
domestically. 124 The obligation that Nigeria has under the
Protocol as a signatory differs from that which it would have after
ratification. Signature of a treaty by a state simply creates an
obligation to refrain in good faith from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty, and indicates the State's intention
to be bound by the treaty at a later date. 125 Nigeria is, therefore,
neither responsible for implementing the provisions of the
118. Id. art. 3.
119. CAT, supra note 115, art. 14.
120. Id. art. 17.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 20-21.
123. VCLT, supra note 88, art. 14-15.
124. U.N.
Treaty
Handbook,
ch.
3,
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter U .N. Handbook].
125. VCLT, supra note 88, art. 18.
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Protocol, nor can citizens bring claims against the government to
the Committee.
Nigeria's last report to CEDAW was in 1998, prior to the
formal implementation of Shari' a in the northern states. 126 In its
report to CEDA W, the representative noted that traditional
practices had a heavy impact on the implementation of CEDA W in
rural areas. 127 The representative concluded that customary,
traditional, and religious practices impeded the advancement of
women, and that despite considerable progress, there was much
work needed to gain equality between the sexes. 128 Based upon
the Nigerian report the Committee made several findings and
recommendations to Nigeria in order for them to further comply
with their responsibilities under CEDAW.
The Committee found the predominance of cultural
stereotypes prejudicial to women in Nigeria present serious
dangers to the physical and emotional health of women, violating
their fundamental human rights. 129 "The coexistence of three legal
systems, civil, religious and customary, makes it difficult to adopt
and enforce laws which genuinely protect women's rights." 130 The
committee was "very concerned" with the violation of women's
human rights by religious and customary laws and practices in the
family context and recommended that measures be taken to change
laws and cultural norms allowing for such injustices as polygamy,
one-sided repudiation, and unequal subsistence rights. 131
Furthermore, the committee found that in spite of Nigeria's
ratification of CEDA W without reservation, the Convention was
not adequately implemented into the legal and constitutional
framework. 132
B. Reservations to CEDA W based upon Islamic Law

Although Nigeria did not make reservations to CEDAW,

126. Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and Compliance with
International
Legal
Instruments
on
Women,
available
at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/country/compliancetbl.PDF. (last visited Apr. 10,
2004).
127.
18th and
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
19th Sess. at 62. U.N.Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998) [hereinafter Report].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Report, supra note 127, at 63.
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many other states where Shari' a is in practice have ratified
CEDA W subject to the applicability of Islamic Law. Reservations
are "unilateral statements, however phrased or named, made by a
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect
of certain provisions of the treaty in application to that State. " 133
Parties make reservations when they wish to accept most of the
obligations of the treaty but do not agree with a particular
provision. 134 Reservations are therefore effective in enabling
states to participate in multilateral treaties that they would
otherwise be unwilling or unable to participate in. 135 In narrowly
defining their obligation, reserving states avoid adhering to
provisions they do not intend to implement, making them less
CEDAW has grown in
accountable to the convention. 136
membership numbers due to the ability of states to make broad
reservations, therefore, giving it a worldwide membership. 137
Despite the growth in membership numbers, CEDA W remains
ineffective in many member states due to the power. of reservation,
and the lack of enforcement mechanisms.
Reservations to CEDA W cannot contradict "the object and
purpose of the treaty." 138 When a state has made a reservation,
other member states to CEDAW have the option of accepting the
reservation either expressly, or impliedly; or "they can object to
the reservation; or they can object and preclude the treaty from
entering into force between them and the reserving state." 139
Therefore, CEDAW member states have a great deal of
subjectivity in determining their position with regards to a
reserving state, despite the intention that it be an objective
standard. 140
133. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27,1980) art. 2, ~ 1, § d, cited in
Riddle, supra note 76, at 605.
134. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 73, at 132.
135. U.N. Handbook, supra note 124.
136. Riddle, supra note 77, at 618.
137. Id. at 622.
138. CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 28; This stipulation on reservations stems from the
ICJ advisory decision in the Genocide Convention Case 1951I.CJ.15. There the court held
that states may ratify a treaty with reservation without assent by all member states of the
reservation, and that all reservations to multilateral treaties should be evaluated to ensure
that their reservation does not violate the defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
139. Riddle, supra note 77, at 609; see also VCLT, supra note 189, arts. 18-23.
140. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and The Convention
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There are twelve states that made reservations to CEDA W
contingent upon Shari' a. They are Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamariya, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. 141 An example
of such a reservation is that which was issued by Egypt upon
ratification and that states in pertinent part: "The Arab Republic
of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this article (2),
provided that such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic
Shari'a." 142 This reservation applies to Article 2 of CEDA W,
which states: "States Parties condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, agree to pursue, by all appropriate means
and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women ... " 143 Germany, Mexico, Netherlands and Sweden all
entered objections to the reservation made by Egypt, stating that it
was contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty . 144 Each of
these four countries explicitly stated that, although it objected to
the reservation, it did not render the treaty unenforceable between
itself and Egypt. 145
The general reservation made by Egypt to Article 2 of
CEDA W allowed for Shari' a law to take precedence over the
implementation of legislation to eradicate discrimination against
women within Egypt. 146 Egypt escapes liability for violations
under Article 2, as long as it can show that they were acting in
accordance with Shari' a. 147 This reservation arguably undermines
the object and purpose of the treaty, as the Committee called on
States to re-examine their reservations to Article 2, stating that
withdrawal of these reservations would indicate their strong
commitment to achieving the full equality of women. 148 "The
Convention allows States to commit themselves to women's
on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 301 ( 1991 ).
141. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
20th Session, 1999.
142. CEDAW
Reservations,
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty 10 .asp (last
visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Reservations].
143. CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 2.
144. Reservations, supra note 142.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. VCLT, supra note 88, art 21.
148. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
20th Session, 1999, available at http://www.un.org/womanwatch/daw/cedaw/20thsess.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
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equality, while simultaneously admitting they have no intention of
granting women equality." 149 This same hypocrisy exists in all
treaties allowing reservations, perpetuating the constant struggle
between enforcing international law and maintaining domestic
sovereignty.
The reservations made by States in correlation with Shari' a
have been vigorously attacked by women's rights advocates
around the world, as well as opposed by other members to
CEDAW, and yet the reservations still stand. As Ann Elizabeth
Mayer points out, the ongoing tension between Islamic and
western culture is one reason for this dichotomy:
Attempts to deter the practice for reservations in conflict with the
object and purpose of CEDAW have met resistance in the form of
accusations that these were tantamount to Westem attacks on Islam and
or the Third World. An attempt made by the CEDAW committee in
1987 to examine the basis for reservations that used Islam as the
grounds for non-compliance ... resulted in a strong diplomatic backlash.
Muslim countries quickly rallied to stop the project intimating that the
CEDAW committee was engaged in cultural imperialism and attacking
Islam. 150
Reservations are not the sole cause for the ineffective nature
of CEDA W and CAT. As previously stated, Nigeria entered both
treaties without reservation, and yet the implementation of Shari' a
in the northern states sentenced Amina Lawal to death by stoning.
The lack of compelling sanctions and penalties for noncompliance allow for state parties such as Nigeria to choose not to
enforce its terms. 151 There is no effective enforcement mechanism
to prevent Nigeria and other states from discriminating against
women. 152 CEDA W does not authorize the Committee to find a
state party in violation of its provisions, nor does it allow for
situations to be redressed in a timely manner. 153 As a result,
CEDA W has become more of a "statement of intent than a set of
internationally binding obligations. " 154
149. Julie A. Minor, An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. lNT'L & COMP. L.
137, 144 (1994).
150. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A Benign Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid has been
Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. lNT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 271 (2001).
151. See Ritz, supra note 98, at 204.
152. Id. at 205.
153. Id.
154. Clark, supra note 140, at 285-86.
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C. The Protocol

The Protocol does little to further promote the effectiveness
of CEDAW. The Protocol applies only to States party to both
CEDAW and the Protocol, thereby limiting its reach only to the 4 7
Since
party States who have ratified both documents. 155
ratification is optional, members of CEDA W are not required to
sign or ratify the Protocol in order to maintain membership in
CEDAW. State parties can "opt out" of Articles 8 and 9,
precluding the Committee from investigating within a State
Such a reservation
against whom a complaint is filed. 156
eliminates the key advancement that the Protocol boasts, rendering
it worthless.
The Protocol is non-binding and failures to adhere to its terms
are not sanctionable. 157 Once the Committee finds a State
violative of its duties, its decision is merely advisory, and no
mechanism exists to administer the recommendations made by the
Committee in redressing the violation. 158 Therefore, the Protocol
becomes another soft law addition to human rights jurisprudence
with little discernable impact on the actions of member states.
D. CAT

Shari' a implementation in Nigeria also conflicts with the
country's duties under CAT, which was ratified by Nigeria in June
of 1991, following the implementation of Shari' a in the northern
states. 159 The punishments called for by Shari' a include stoning to
CAT applies where state
death, flogging, and amputation. 16
officials inflict, consent, or acquiesce to torturous acts. 161 Under
CAT, "[no] exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." 162

°

155. Clark, supra note 140, at 209.
156. Ritz, supra note 98, at 210; Protocol, supra note 101.
157. Id. at 211, citing Andre Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of
Women: A Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679
at 766-67 (1996).
158. See Protocol, supra note 101, art. 8-9.
159. CAT
Status
of
Ratification,
at
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/conratification.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
160. J. Schacht, Law and Justice, CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, vol. II, pt.
VIII/ch. 4 at 541.
161. CAT, supra note 115, art. 1.
162. Id. art. 2.
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Inaction is viewed as action under CAT . 163 Therefore, as long as
the official government refuses to take action to prevent the
occurrence of torture within the country, Nigeria is in violation of
their duties despite the fact that Shari' a is not the official
government of the state.
E. Amina 's Rights under international Law

CEDA W, the Protocol, and CAT provide citizens like Amina
with enforceable rights within Nigeria. Under CEDA W, Nigeria
has undertaken to prevent all forms of discrimination against
women. 164 The failure of the Nigerian government to intervene in
the implementation of a legal system such as Shari'a, which places
value on female modesty and chastity and considers female
sexuality threatening, seriously undermines the country's treaty
obligations. 165 However, CEDA W allows for the member State,
not the individual, to bring claims of discrimination. 166 A
subcommittee then reports to the CEDAW committee and
represents Amina. 167 The committee could then take the necessary
steps toward ending discriminatorls practices such as the male
dominance that Shari' a promotes. 1 8 The process is lengthy and
further frustrated by Amina' s inability to bring the claim herself,
instead having to rely on her government, whose inaction is at
least partially responsible for the abridgement of her rights. As a
consequence, Amina had little hope of invalidating her sentence
under CEDAW.
The Optional Protocol, once ratified, would give Amina the
ability to bring a claim directly against the State to the
committee. 169 The ability of the committee to take interim
measures to avoid irreparable harm would have afforded Amina a
stay to her execution while her situation was investigated. 170 If
determined to be necessary, the committee would then have the

163. Id. art. 1.
164. CEDAW, supra note 81.
165. Blake M. Guy, Female Genital Excisions and the Implications of Federal
Prohibition, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 125, 142 (1995).
166. See generally CEDAW, supra note 81, arts. 17-21; see also Fact Sheet No. 22,
Discrimination
Against
Women:
The
Convention
and
Committee,
at
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs22.htm#implementing (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Protocol, supra note 101, art. 2.
170. Id. art. 5.
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power to declare violations to the treaty and submit its outline for
proposed changes to the Nigerian government. 171 Furthermore, the
government would then have the opportunity to remedy the
violations before the committee takes further actions, such as
petitioning the U .N. General Assembly to impose economic
sanctions. 172 Due to Nigeria's current signatory status, Amina's
only hope under the Protocol was that the inaction taken by the
Nigerian government classifies as frustrating the object and
purpose of the treaty. 173 However, this is unlikely because Amina
would have had to rely on the CEDA W administrative process,
which stipulates that the State bring her claim. 174 Therefore,
unless ratified, the Protocol offered little recourse to Amina.
Under CAT, individual citizens of a State party have the right
to bring complaints to the committee when their rights under the
treaty have been threatened or abrogated. 175 For an individual to
do so, the State must have expressly recognized the power of the
Committee Against Torture to admit and examine individual
communications. 176 Since Nigeria signed CAT in 1988 and did not
ratify until 2001, it has yet to expressly recognize the Committee
under article 21. As such, neither Amina nor her relatives or
representatives may have entered a complaint regarding her
impending execution. 177 Instead, Nigeria must have filed a
complaint with the committee on her behalf. 178 CAT requires that
all domestic remedies must be exhausted before invoking the
protection that it affords. 179
Amina had a far greater chance for success under CAT than
under CEDA W or the Protocol. Having ratified the treaty in June
2001, Nigeria is required to submit a report to the committee
outlining how they intend to implement the treaty into their
domestic legislation, as well as the steps that they have already

171. Protocol, supra note 101, art 7-8.
172. Id. art 9.
173. VCLT, supra note 88, art. 12.
174. CEDAW, supra note 81, arts. 17-21.
175. CAT, supra note 115, at art. 22.
176. Overview of the Procedure under the Convention Against Torture, available at
http://193.l 94.138.l 90/html/menu2/8/overcat.htm. (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Procedure].
177. See generally CAT, supra note 115, art. 12-14, 21.
178. Id.
179. Id. art. 21(a).
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towards achieving compliance within one year of ratification. 180
Nigeria was scheduled to submit their report to the Committee in
July 2002 but missed the deadline. 181 Compliance with CAT
would require the Nigerian government to take affirmative steps to
end the use of torture within the State. 182 By stepping in to
prevent Amina's death by stoning, Nigeria would have effectuated
the primary objectives of CAT, thus fulfilling their treaty
obligations.
Nigeria could then report its actions to the
committee, and have met their treaty obligations to begin domestic
prevention of torture and reporting on their progress. Therefore,
the timeliness of Nigeria's ratification of CAT provided Amina
with her greatest chance for protection under international law.

IV. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTUATING INTERNATIONAL
0BLIGATIONS

International human rights laws can no longer exist as soft
laws with little or no effective enforcement methods.
A
tremendous gap exists between what is theoretically guaranteed to
women and what women actually experience around the world. 183
On paper, women are free from discrimination in 168 countries. 184
In each of those countries, legislation should be applied
consistently, equalizing the rights of men and women. 185 In each
CEDAW country, men and women should have equal property
rights, marriage rights, parental rights, access to employment, and
healthcare. 186 In reality, women continue to face discrimination in
many ways throughout the CEDA W countries. 187 Reform is
necessary to bridge the gap between guarantees and reality. To
effectuate the provisions of CEDA W, the Protocol, and CAT,
changes must be made regarding reservations, applicability, and

180. Id.
181. Report of the Committee Against Torture, 27th and 28th Sess. at 93, U.N. Doc.
A/57 /44 (2002).
182. CAT, supra note 115, art. 2.
183. McCabe, supra note 93, at 459.
184. Status ofRatifications of the Principal International Human Rights, supra note 79.
185. See CEDAW, supra note 81, art 2.
186. Id. arts. 2-16.
187. See generally Evatt, supra note 82; Ritz, supra note 98; Chantelle Forgues, Global
Hurdle: The Implementation of an International Nondiscrimination Norm Protecting
Women From Gender Discrimination in International Sports 18 B.U. INT'L L. J. 247 (2000);
Mayer, supra note 150; Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights Under the
Convention on the Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1 (1996).
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enforcement.
To ensure international peace and security, the United
Nations has the rower to enforce the principles of its Charter upon
non-members. 18 One of these principles is the "achievement of
international cooperation .. .in promoting and encouraging respect
In
for human rights ... without distinction as to ... sex." 189
promoting this core principle, CEDA W should apply to members
and non-members; thereby, encouraging non-members to the
Convention and the Protocol to ratify both with limited
opportunity for reservations.
The reservation process must be refined to allow only for
narrowly defined reservation to specific portions of the treaty.1 90
The object and purpose of the treaty must be in the initial article,
to which no country will be allowed reservations. Although
preservation of religious laws and customs are the baseline for
much ratification, the broad based reservations currently in
existence severely undermine the purpose and effect of many
treaties. 191 The restructuring of reservations will further
CEDAW's goal to realign States' priorities in protecting religious
sensibilities and women's rights.1 9
The treaty monitoring process must be reformed to give the
CEDA W Committee substantial power to oversee the compliance
of member States. 193 More effective follow-up procedures as well
as imminent repercussions for failure to meet report deadlines may
lead to greater commitment of States to fulfill their obligations
under CEDA W. 194 The Committee should have the power to
overrule reservations that go against the object and purpose of the
treaty . 195 Furthermore, timetables must be implemented to ensure
that justice is swift. The improved scheme outlined in the
Protocol allows for six-month intervals between complaint,
answer, and review of reported violations.1 96
To better implement the provisions, CEDA W must be

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6.
Id. art. 1, para. 3.
Brandt, supra note 87, at 141.

Id.
Id.
Evatt, supra note 82, at 552-53.
Id. at 553.
Riddle, supra note 77, at 637.
Protocol, supra note 101, art. 6.
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amended to increase the number of committee members. The
members would divide by geographic regions such as continents,
and then further subdivided by regions. This will allow committee
members to become familiar with the governments in their region,
as well as their history of compliance with their responsibilities
under the treaty. Such an expansion will also expedite the
complaint process by allowing each committee to issue a ruling
and assign damages. These smaller committees would also have
the preliminary injunctive powers suggested under the Protocol.
Where a threat of imminent harm is found to exist, the Committee
could suspend the injurious action pending its review of the
circumstances. The result would be faster and more effective
functioning of the current committee with binding effect.
Individuals or their representatives could petition the Committee
at large and request an appeal from the decision of the subcommittee, which the Committee could grant if substantive legal
issues need to be addressed.
Enforcement mechanisms must be installed to ensure
compliance by State parties with CEDA W and the Protocol. 197
The United Nations Security Council has the authority to extend
economic and trade sanctions. 198 Sanctions are non-military
measures used to influence nations to conform to some desired
behavior or to punish a nation for violating international law . 199
Therefore, sanctions should be levied against signatory countries
To avoid additional
that consistently violate CEDA W. 200
inconsistencies in application of sanctions, a detailed definition of
what constitutes an egregious violation, as well as a three-strike
system for warning a country of their violation, should be
employed.
Once a State party is found to consistently and egregiously
violate their responsibilities under international human rights law,
the corresponding committee should enter the country in order to
monitor the government's actions.
By allowing a team of
committee members into the country, their presence will serve as a
constant reminder to the leadership of their international

197. McCabe, supra note 93, at 459.
198. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
199. Joy K. Fausey, Does the United Nations Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect
Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 193, 194
(1994).
200. McCabe, supra note 93, at 459.
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obligations, as well as their obligations to their own population.
This team would work with the domestic lawmakers to design an
enforcement scheme that compliments the needs of that particular
country. The formulation of the team members will depend on the
demographics of the country. For example, in Nigeria, members
would have to be educated about the various aboriginal tribes, the
history of political turmoil, the current government as well as
Shari' a Law. Such a system would work toward a solution by
understanding the problem, and respecting the culture and
civilization of that sovereign state.
Although the Nigerian
government has failed to take action to stop the violations of its
citizens' human rights, it has not actively supported the
mistreatment.
Where the domestic government has continuously tried and
failed to ensure the human rights of its population, a third party
would be most beneficial in providing a fresh approach to finding
a solution. This resident team approach would likely not be
successful in countries where the government is itself committing
the violations and continuously refusing to remedy their actions.
In situations such as that, economic sanctions or occupation by
U.N. forces may be more effective.
These proposed steps are a far cry from ensuring international
equal rights to women. What they represent are a series of small
steps that will lead the global community in the direction that
CEDA W, the Protocol and CAT prescribe. At the least, the grant
of broad reservation powers must cease, regardless of the cultural,
religious, or moral foundations upon which they purport to rest.
For Nigeria, these steps would likely cause a great deal of internal
conflict, as made clear by the incessant violence, riots, and civil
war plaguing the country on a daily basis.
As evidenced by the Miss World pageant, a great deal of
tension exists between the Muslim north and the Christian south in
Nigeria. 201 It is likely that once faced with the possibility of
sanctions, or even a trade embargo, Nigeria would quickly react to
the suggestions of the CEDA W Committee. 202 Nigeria's entire
201. See AP, Miss World Leaves Nigeria, supra note 62.
202. For a discussion on the effectiveness of sanctions, see Richard W. Parker, The
Problem with Scorecards: How (And How Not) To Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of
Economic Sanctions, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 235 (2000); see also Joy K. Fausey, Does the
United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own
Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 193; see also Cassandra LaRae-Perez,
Economic Sanctions As a Use of Force: Re-evaluating the Legality of Sanctions From an
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economy is dependent upon the exportation of oil, as the sixth
largest producer of petroleum in the world. 203 It also has no
operating oil refineries and must import gasoline. 204 The current
civil unrest prompted a recent thirty percent cutback in oil
Chevron's cutback has received
production by Chevron. 205
international attention and provoked the government to take
further military action in order to control the situation. 206
This reaction by the government illustrates that the threat of
economic or trade sanctions would likely impact their decision to
react to the enforcement of Shari'a law within Nigeria. Once the
government took positive steps to ensure that torturous
punishments are no longer used and that justice is delivered
without attention to gender, the international community would
view Nigeria as attempting to fulfill their international
commitments. This compliance may come at the enormous cost of
peace within the country as the Islamic north and Christian south
collide over the tension between religious freedom and human
equality. However, forced compliance with international treaties
will no doubt also come at a price to Nigeria, one which may
hinder their ability to enter into future treaties for fear of the
domestic consequences, but that cannot bar the enforcement of
international human rights for women.
CONCLUSION

Amina Lawal' s life may have been saved by international
pressure forcing Nigeria into compliance with CEDA W and CAT,
yet the battle for women's rights would have scarcely begun. In
Nigeria, or any predominantly Islamic country, women face daily
struggles against sexist regimes cloaked in religious tradition.
Outside the Islamic faith, women struggle to overcome the same
history of diminution and male dominance.
The global community has identified discrimination against
women as a threat to international peace and progress. The result
of this realization is CEDAW and the Protocol. Each reflects a
worldwide commitment to ending the disparity between the sexes.
Each treaty is inadequate not for a lack of vision, but for a lack of
Effects-Based Perspective, 20 B.U. INT'L L. J. 161 (2002).
203. Starr, supra note 36, at 390.
204. Id.
205. AP, Oil Crises, supra note 55.
206. Id.
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enforcement.
The international community must respond to the enduring
crisis that is soft law. The treaty process must be revised to
include enforcement mechanisms that deliver quick, consistent
outcomes. Reservations must be narrowly tailored and granted
only if consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Committees created to effectuate the goals of treaties must be
given the power to adjudicate complaints and assign reparation.
These committees must have injunctive powers to prevent the
possibility of further injury to complainants during their period of
review. Changes such as those proposed here are vital to the
future of the international community. A baseline for human
rights for women must be universally accepted and enforced to
prevent future loss of life. Action must be taken to ensure
equality. Thousands of lives, like that of Amina, depend on it.
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